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 1 
The Nought Belief Paradox 
Abstract: A paradox is presented that the poses new problems for both the truth norm 
and the knowledge norm of belief. 
 
Nicholas Shackel  Erkenntnis 2014. The final publication is available at 
link.springer.com 
 
Williams 1973 suggested that belief aims at truth. The broad idea behind the metaphor 
is that there is a constitutive connection between belief and truth. Left like that, however, 
the idea remains vague. Recent literature has sought to make the idea definite by 
interpreting it in terms of a norm, for example:  
I take it to be a conceptual truth that beliefs are correct when true and 
incorrect when false (Velleman 2000:277)1 
Such norms would be trivial if correctness were merely a synonym for truth. It is 
JHQHUDOO\DJUHHGWKDWLWPXVWEHWDNHQDVDQRUPDWLYHWHUPµconcerning what one ought to 
do¶Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007:277). $V*LEEDUGSXWVLWµFRUUHFWQHVVLVDQRUPDWLYH
PDWWHU¶Gibbard 2003:85) which, as Boghossian (Boghossian 2003:35) points out, when 
taken generally \LHOGVSULQFLSOHVH[SUHVVHGLQWHUPVRIµRXJKW¶6RWKLVJLYHVXV 
Truth Norm: a proposition ought to be believed iff it is true. 2 
Reservations can be raised for both directions of this bi-conditional. In epistemology it 
is widely accepted that a justified belief can be false and for anyone who thinks that what 
ought to be believed is what is justified, the left to right direction will look false. 
Nevertheless, the left to right direction has been widely accepted in the literature on the 
aim of belief. For example, those who accept that justification is a normative concept can 
still conclude 
For any P, one ought to believe that P only if P« It is in this sense that 
truth is the fundamental norm of belief, since someone who would not 
recognize the truth of this imperative would not understand the very concept 
of belief. (Engel 2001:47-8) 
More broadly, in the literature on normativity a number of authors allow reasons and 
oughts to diverge. Dancy, whilst asserting a correlation and dependence between reasons 
and oughts,  explicitly contrasts reason giving from ought-making (Dancy 2004:33). 
Perhaps the most extreme example is %URRPH¶V(Broome 2006) suggestion of there being 
ought facts for which there are no contributory reasons.  
In fact there are quite different approaches taken to the relation of justification and 
ought facts in epistemology, in the ethics of belief, in the philosophy of normativity and 
rationality, and in the philosophy of mind concerned with intentionality. Certainly, in 
some cases the work in one area is done with an eye on another, even to defend a specific 
position in another (see for example Adler 2002). Nevertheless, because of the very 
                                                 
1
 &IµDEHOLHILVFRUUHFWLIDQGRQO\LIWKHSURSRVLWLRQEHOLHYHGLVWUXH¶Wedgwood 2002µWKDW
truth is the standard of correctness for belief... is expressed in the prescription to believe that p 
RQO\LISLVWUXH¶Shah 20037KHPRVWUHFHQWH[DPSOH,NQRZµ0RUHJHQHUDOO\WUXHEHOLHIV
DUHFRUUHFWRUULJKWIDOVHEHOLHIVDUHLQFRUUHFWRUZURQJ¶ (Whiting 2013b:121). 
2
 &Iµ)RUDQ\p: One ought to believe that p only if p«,Ip, then one ought to believe that p¶
(Boghossian 2003:37). µ)RUDQ\S, p: S ought to believe that p if and only if p LVWUXH¶Bykvist 
and Hattiangadi 2007:277) 
 2 
different treatments of the relation in these areas the assumption that what ought to be 
believed is what is justified is too quick. 
The reason for this divergence in our case is, I think, that the literature on the aim of 
belief and the truth norm has been focused on the constitutive question, on whether what 
it is to be a belief is to be something for which truth sets a constitutive standard, and in 
that sense ought to be true. Justification would then be indirectly related to what ought to 
be believed, potentially to be explained in terms of the truth norm, making justifiers 
indicators of truth, indicators of a belief being as it ought to be. Those who relate 
justification directly to what ought to be believed are either directly rejecting that view or 
DOWHUQDWLYHO\XVLQJµRXJKW¶WRPDUNVRPHWKLQJRWKHUWKDQDFRQVWLWXWLYHVWDQGDUGRIEHOLHI  
The right-to-left direction faces a problem of trivial truths such as the number of blades 
of grass that are on the lawn: ought that to be believed? It seems doubtful. There has been 
significant discussion of this problem  with some willing to abandon this direction and 
some defending it as it stands. For example, it can be defended on the grounds that oughts 
indicate what is ideal and in characterising the constitutive standard of belief as truth we 
can idealise believers. Ideal believers ought, indeed, to believe all truths, however trivial.  
The trivial truth problem is merely a constraint that arises from the finitude of our minds. 
Given that finitude the domain of truths over which the norm applies is restricted by the 
practical context of the believer.  
The reason for this short review of reservations about the norm is two-fold. First,  to 
allow that whilst the norm is controversial and faces difficulties, it is yet defended and 
defensible. Second, to make it clear that the paradox presented here is an entirely 
independent problem for the norm that will stand even if other problems are resolved.  
Before we turn to the paradox we must also note that for any such norm there are a 
family of related norms depending on exact terminology and the logical nature of the 
QRUPDWLYHRSHUDWRUµ5HTXLUHG¶µULJKW¶µFRUUHFW¶µSURSHU¶ µMXVWLILHG¶ µSHUPLVVLEOH¶PLJKW
DOOEHXVHGLQSODFHRIµRXJKW¶µ5HTXLUHG¶DQGµSHUPLWWHG¶DUHGXDOV3 µUHTXLUHG¶DQG
µIRUELGGHQ¶DUHLQQHUQHJDWLRQV4 µSHUPLWWHG¶DQGµIRUELGGHQ¶DUHRXWHUQHJDWLRQV5 Each of  
µULJKW¶µFRUUHFW¶µRXJKW¶FDQDSSHDUWREHWKHLQQHUQHJDWLRQRIµZURQJ¶µLQFRUUHFW¶
µRXJKW-QRW¶UHVSHFWLYHO\LQVRPHFRQWH[WVDQGWKHRXWHUQHJDWLRQLQRWKHUV6RWKHIDPLO\
of related norms is very extensive. For some of them it is evident that the paradox I shall 
present would carry over by formulating the paradoxical proposition in the same terms. 
For others it is not. I am not here going to try to account for the whole family. I am 
VWLFNLQJWRµRXJKW¶EHFDXVHLWFDQEHWDNHQLQDUHTXLULQJVHQVHDSHUPLWWLQJVHQVHD
contributory sense, and an overall sense, and for these reasons it can generalise over the 
normative features of many other normative terms and is thereby the most general 
normative term. 
$PRUHFRPSOH[LVVXHLVWKDWRIVFRSHZKHWKHUWKHVFRSHRIµRXJKW¶LVZLGHRUQDUURZ
The idea that we may commit a modal fallacy in normative conditionals has been known 
and discussed for some time (e.g. Dancy 1977; Broome 1999, 2007).  For example, 
consider )RUUHVWHU¶VGentle Murder Paradox (Forrester 1984). If you murder Fred you 
ought to murder him gently. You are going to murder Fred. Therefore you ought to murder 
him gently. Murdering him gently entails murdering him so you ought to murder him. A 
TXHVWLRQDERXWWKHILUVWSUHPLVVLVZKHWKHUWKHZKROHFRQGLWLRQDOLVLQWKHVFRSHRIµRXJKW¶
(wide scope) or only the consequent (narrow scope). One way of resisting the paradox is 
WRSRLQWRXWWKDWWKHILUVWSUHPLVVLVQRWWUXHXQOHVVWDNHQDVDZLGHVFRSHµRXJKW¶ whereas 
                                                 
3
 e.g. walking is required iff it is not permissible not to walk  
4
 e.g.  walking is required iff it is forbidden not to walk 
5
 e.g. walking is permitted iff it is not forbidden to walk 
 3 
the validity of the inference to the intermediate conclusion depends on taking it as having 
narrow scope, hence the argument is unsound or invalid. 
,KDYHGHYHORSHGWKHSDUDGR[E\WDNLQJWKHQRUPVWRKDYHQDUURZVFRSHµRXJKWV¶
5XQQLQJWKHSDUDGR[RQWKHQRUPVWDNHQDVZLGHVFRSHµRXJKWV¶ZRXOGLQYROYHWKH
additional complexity of specifying conditions under which we can detach a normative 
consequent from a wide scope normative conditional. Those conditions are controversial 
but it is widely agreed that there have to be such conditions. For this reason, even if the 
norms should be taken as wide scope, I doubt (but have not proved) they can be saved 
from this paradox by that fact. 
One response to the difficulties faced by the truth norm is to change the aim: 
belief aims at knowledge. (Williamson 2000:47) 
There has been less discussion of the formulation of this aim as a norm and for that reason 
its expression is both more scattered and not as much analysed. Nevertheless, I offer here 
a number of quotations in support of formulating it as a knowledge norm of the same 
form as our truth norm.  
Left to right 
RQHVKRXOG«EHOLHve p only if one knows p (Williamson 2000:11)  
belief aims or ought to aim at knowledge (Bird 2007:93) 
(NK) For any p, believe that p only if, for all you know, p (Engel 2004:90) 
(QJHO¶Vprinciple GRHVQ¶Wimmediately fit with the others but in its context ,GRQ¶WNQRZ
how to understand it except as a version of the left-to-right conditional. Engel is asserting 
that knowledge sets the standard for belief and so Engel intends this to be a knowledge 
norm of belief. Furthermore, he says µJLYHQWKDWNQRZOHGJHHQWDLOVWUXWKWUXWKLVVWLOO«WKH
DLPRIEHOLHI¶ (Engel 2004:90). So it is knowing what you believe, rather than knowing 
something else (as his VSHDNLQJRIµIRUDOO\RXNQRZ¶PDNHVLWVRXQGOLNHWKDWGRHVWKH
work. 
Right to left 
if one knows that P, then one can hardly be wrong to believe that P 
(Williamson 2005:108)  
it may be arguable that knowledge suffices for epistemic correctness 
(Hawthorne 2004:23 fn. 58) 
Both 
One may believe that p if and only if one knows that p. (Whiting 2013a:184) 
LWLVFRUUHFWWREHOLHYH«DSURSRVLWLRQLIDQGRQO\LIRQHLVLQDSRVLWLRQWR
know it (Smithies 2012:266) 
We can also give an argument from the knowledge norm of assertion. 
If one is entitled to judge that p one should be entitled to assert that p to 
oneself. Since the latter entitlement entails knowledge, so then does the 
former. At the same time, what one is entitled to assert to others one is 
entitled to judge. «knowledge is the norm for judgment if and only if it is 
the norm for assertion¶. Bird 2007:95   
So given that one ought to assert iff one knows (defended, for example, by Brown 2010), 
we have  
 4 
Knowledge Norm: a proposition ought to be believed iff it is known. 
:HVKRXOGSHUKDSVDOVRQRWHWKHLQWXLWLYHSODXVLELOLW\RIWKLVQRUP7KDWRQH¶VEHOLHILV
NQRZOHGJHVHHPVWRVXIILFHIRURQH¶VEHOLHIEHLQJDVLWRXJKWWREH. How could it be 
wrong, what could the defect be that makes it other than as it ought to be, if you know it? 
On necessity, false beliefs are in some sense not as they ought to be (that is the intuition 
underlying the direction of the truth norm that has faced fewer objections). Furthermore, 
HYHQLIMXVWLILFDWLRQGRHVQ¶WVXIILFHIRUDEHOLHIEHLQJDVLWRXJKWif we reject the truth 
norm because we find truth alone insufficient then we may have in mind another relation 
between things being as they ought to be and justification: that justification is a 
requirement. Finally, deontic intuitions about µought¶IRUH[DPSOHanalogous to those at 
play in the thought that it is not enough merely to do good but necessary do it non-
accidentally, for the right reasons, with suitably sensitivity to the circumstances, and so 
on, could lead to the anti-Gettier conditions on belief such as being non-accidentally true.  
The earlier remarks I made about controversiality, defensibility, the relation of 
justification and ought facts, the family of related norms, the generality of the term 
µRXJKW¶DQGWKHVFRSHRIWKHµRXJKW¶apply here as well. Once again, the paradox 
presented here is an entirely independent problem for the norm that will stand even if 
other problems are resolved. 
The paradoxical proposition 
x Nought Belief: This proposition ought not to be believed6 
Contradiction for the Truth Norm 
1RXJKWEHOLHILVWUXHLIILWLVQ¶WWUXH 
If Nought Belief is true then it ought not to be believed (because that is what it says) so 
is not true (by the Truth Norm). If Nought Belief is not true then it ought not to be 
believed (by the Truth Norm) so it is true (since that is what it says). 
This contradiction seems to be a straightforward threat to the Truth Norm. 
Contradiction for the Knowledge Norm 
I know NRXJKW%HOLHILII,GRQ¶WNQRZLW 
Left-to-right: If I know Nought Belief then it is true (factivity) so I ought not to believe 
it (because that is what it says) VR,GRQ¶WNQRZLWE\the Knowledge Norm) 
Right-to-left:  Suppose I doQ¶WNQRZ1RXJKW%HOLHI I can now come to know NB on 
WKDWVXSSRVLWLRQE\UHDVRQLQJ³,I,GRQ¶WNQRZNought Belief then it ought not to be 
EHOLHYHGE\WKH.QRZOHGJH1RUPVRLWLVWUXHEHFDXVHWKDWLVZKDWLVVD\V´7 
 Spelling that out:  
1. 6XSSRVH,GRQ¶t know Nought Belief 
2. I know I GRQ¶WNQRZ it (I can know this, for example, by the proof just given of 
left-to-right).   
3. I know that if it is not known then it ought not to be believed (we can suppose I 
know the Knowledge Norm).  
4. So I know it ought not to be believed (2, 3, by single premiss closure for 
knowledge).  
5. I know if it ought not to be believed then it is true (because that is what is says).  
                                                 
6
 This paradox was provoked by Pelling¶s (Pelling 2011) paradox for the truth account of 
assertion. See also Pelling 2012. 
7
 6XFKFRPSHWHQWGHGXFWLRQUHWDLQLQJNQRZOHGJHWKURXJKRXWILWV+DZWKRUQH¶V6LQJOH-Premise 
Closure principle, see Hawthorne 2004:34. 
 5 
6. So I know it is true (4, 5, by single premiss closure for knowledge).  
7. 6RLI,GRQ¶WNQRZ1RXJKW%HOLHIWKHQ I know it (1, 6, conditional proof).  
,ILWLVWKRXJKWWKDWNQRZLQJWKDW,GRQ¶WNQRZUHPDLQVDVDQREMHFWLRQDEO\XQGLVFKDUJHG
assumption of the proof of right-to-left, we can prove that assumption. 
(LWKHU,NQRZ1RXJKW%HOLHIRU,GRQ¶W)URPWKHSURRIRf left-to-right, if I know it then 
I GRQ¶WNQRZLW,I,GRQ¶WNQRZLWWKHQ,GRQ¶WNQRZLWSo by disjunctive syllogism ,GRQ¶W
know it. Since I know the premisses of this argument I know its conclusion by multi-
premiss closure.8 Therefore I know that I dRQ¶WNQRZ1RXJKW%HOLHI 
Furthermore, we can use what we have just proved to give a proof for a second 
contradiction. SXSSRVHWKDW,NQRZ,GRQ¶W know Nought Belief. Using lines 3 to 6 of the 
proof of right-to-left, we can conclude I know Nought Belief and then by conditional 
SURRIFRQFOXGHWKDWLI,NQRZ,GRQ¶WNQRZ1RXJKW%HOLHIWKHQ,NQRZLWNow, by 
factivity, LI,NQRZ,GRQ¶WNQRZ1RXJKWEHOLHIWKHQ,GRQ¶WNQRZLWHaving proved in the 
last paragraph the common antecedent of these two conditionals, applying modus ponens 
twice and conjunction introduction once gives us that I know Nought %HOLHIDQG,GRQ¶W
know Nought Belief.9 
These contradictions GRQ¶W directly threaten the Knowledge Norm because of the 
assumption that I know the Knowledge Norm. So we could take it as a refutation of my 
knowing the Knowledge Norm, which refutation makes it now unknowable for me. Since 
you have followed my reasoning the upshot seems to be that because you have read this 
far, the knowledge norm is now unknowable for you too.   
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